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An International Common Law of
Antitrust
Spencer Weber Waller*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a broad conflict over the direction of future progress in inter-
national competition law. This conflict is exemplified by the very differ-
ent tone and recommendation of expert commentators such as Judge Diane
Wood and Eleanor Fox and others who have participated in this confer-
ence. This conflict is also generally portrayed as a dichotomous choice
between the position advocated by the European Union (EU) and its sup-
porters in favor of a true international antitrust code, or at least an optional
code enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) through its dis-
pute resolution process, and the position of the United States in favor of a
cautious approach emphasizing bilateral cooperation, slow harmonization,
a search for consensus, as well as a preference for further study in lieu of
action at this time. Both positions are well described in a variety of aca-
demic policy and official publications. The EU position has been articu-
lated by such notables as Leon Britten, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, and
Karol von Miert.' The recent United States champions include Joel Klein,
Charles Stark, Douglas Melamed among others.'
I want to explore some of the serious objections that the United States
has raised to the negotiation of an international set of antitrust rules and
the delegation of their enforcement to the WTO. I will suggest some ways
to take these objections into account, but still allow for progress, and a
modest role for organizations like the WTO in promoting competition in
global markets and resolving competition disputes, without having to cre-
ate a full international antitrust code.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to
Robert Berry for his research assistance.
1. See Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets:
Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition
Law, 18 CARDOZo L. REV. 1111 (1996) (summarizing these arguments).
2. See id.
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
II. TAKING THE UNITED STATES AT ITS WORD
If you believe the articulated reasons of the United States,3 the objec-
tions to an international antitrust code enforced by the WTO are some
combination of the following:
1. There is no present consensus on substantive competition rules,
making the negotiation of any code a waste of effort in comparison
to a more practical focus on ensuring that existing antitrust rules
are enforced world-wide;
2. A code, even if enacted, would necessarily reflect a lowest com-
mon denominator approach and have no real significant impact;
3. A code, even if enacted, would be a rigid and static set of rules that
could not be adapted to the rapidly changing circumstances of the
global market or future developments in competition law and pol-
icy;
4. A code approach has the potential to distort the normatively desir-
able pro-consumer/efficiency evolution of United States and global
policy in antitrust field;
5. The United States would be subject to the whims of a majoritarian
organization and certain hostile members only nominally interested
in resolving competition disputes and rather more interested in ad-
vancing non-competition goals through competition channels and
dispute resolutions.4
3. In addition to these heartfelt beliefs by key U.S. officials, I also believe that
bureaucratic political concerns are a powerful explanation of the U.S. ambivalence
on international antitrust issues. These concerns manifest themselves in inter-
agency rivalries given the effect that the creation of a WTO competition code
would have on those who speak for the United States on these issues and the dif-
fering views on competition, trade, and industrial policy held by the various agen-
cies within the United States government. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Inter-
nationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 378-80 (1997); cf.
Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1526-27 (1998) (using economic analysis to suggest that, in a world with extrater-
ritoriality, net importers control the agenda and have no incentive for change in the
status quo without the possibility of side payments).
4. See A. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International
Deregulation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437, 444-45 (1998) (stating that a code
would be too rigid and would lead to injection of non-competition values into en-
forcement); Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Economy - Today
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I want to examine one strain of the U.S. position that helps to explain
the current and historical ambivalence of the United States to efforts to
harmonize or internationalize antitrust law. 5 I suspect that the United
States is reacting at a fundamental level to the vigorous advocacy of a
code, or civil law, approach in the field of competition law that histori-
cally arose in the United States as a court-centered common law tradition.
6
Taking this objection seriously does not automatically lead to a posture of
nullification or obstructionism, but does suggest new routes to proceed if
progress is to be made toward global rules to govern competition in global
markets.
Taking a common law approach does require several changes to the
current dialogue. Instead of a conflict between two antitrust superpowers
or personalities, the challenge of international antitrust regime creation
7
and Tomorrow, Remarks Before the European Institute Eighth Annual Transatlan-
tic Seminar on Trade and Investment, (Nov. 4, 1998) (visited Sept. 24, 19990
<http:// www.ftc.gov/sp-eches> ( doubting a consensus on substantive principles);
Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at
the End of the Twentieth Century, Address Before the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute, (Oct. 16, 1997) (visited Sept. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/03press/
03_2.html> (describing that internationalization diverts attention from practical
efforts at improving enforcement and would be lowest common denominator);
Joel I. Klein, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition
Policy, Address Presented at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, (Nov. 18,
1996) (visited Sept.24, 1999) (visited Sept.24, 1999) <http:// www. us-
doj.gov/03press/03_2.html> ( stating the lowest common denominator concern and
fear of harmful WTO decision making masquerading as competition policy);
Charles S. Stark, Enhancing Market Access Through Trade and Antitrust Law,
Address Before the Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar
Association, (Aug. 8, 1995) ( visited Sept. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/03
press/03_2.html> (indicating there is no consensus and differing policy goals);
Diane P. Wood, Antitrust: A Remedy for Trade Barriers?, Address to the Asian
Law Program, Japan Information Access Project (Mar. 24, 1995) (visited Sept. 24,
1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/03press/03_2.html> (emphasizing no consensus and
potential for more harm than good); Roscoe B. Starek, III, What are the Limits of
Antitrust Cooperation?, Remarks Before the Fourth Annual Symposium on EU
Mergers and Joint ventures: New Commission/New Merger Policy?, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 122743, at *5 (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 1995) ( referring to the lack
of consensus and differing values).
5. See Waller, supra note 1, at 374-80.
6. But see Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing
Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998) (arguing that the
current enforcement system is inherently regulatory and agency centered).
7. Regime theory is just one of the recent contributions that international rela-
tions theory has made to the understanding of international law problems. See
generally REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al., International Law and International Rela-
tions Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 367 (1998) (including bibliography); Robert J. Beck, International Law and
International Relations: The Prospects for Interdisciplinary Collaboration, 1 J.
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more closely resembles a classic problem of comparative law. Therefore,
what is needed is a mechanism or an institution for a dialogue between
civilian and common law lawyers and systems.8 Taking a comparative
law approach seriously would allow the United States to participate more
constructively in the current dialogue and sensitize other countries to the
historical or cultural basis of the U.S. needs. Such a dialogue would allow
progress to be made, if these types of objections are serious ones, and
would expose hypocrisy if they are not the real basis for the current U.S.
policy.
Constructing an international antitrust regime from a common law per-
spective is by no means an easy task. It would require persuading officials
of competition systems operating under the civil law to suspend their
heartfelt historical and cultural preconceptions about how law should be
made as well as persuading U.S. officials to suspend their fear of interna-
tional rule making in this area.
This task of bridging the gap between the two systems is both necessary
and well worth the effort. There is already a rich body of classic interna-
tional law treaty and state practice - akin to an existing body of interna-
tional common law - that can be applied by the WTO and other interna-
tional organizations without the negotiation of a code, a process which I
view for my own reasons as quixotic and ill-advised on the merits. 9
III. FINDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMON LAW OF
COMPETITION
Finding the existing international law rules of competition law is not
easy. This task requires using the classic tools of international law to
identify the core principles of customary international law and treaty law
governing competition in international trade.
One must begin with the sources of international law to identify the ex-
istence of any particular set of rules of international law. For this purpose,
most modern commentators usually begin with the rules of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice which identify the sources of international law as:
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 119 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law
and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205
(1993); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospec-
tusfor International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Kenneth W. Ab-
bott et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: Building
Bridges, 86 PROC. AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L. 167 (1992).
8. For an introduction to the conceptually different framework of the civil law
see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION To
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985).
9. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmoniza-
tion of Law: Lessons From Antitrust, 42 U. KAN, L. REV. 557, 557-61 (1994).
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a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.'
0
I will focus primarily on treaty and custom to suggest that we already
live in a world with certain identifiable international competition rules
constituting international law. While the concept of establishing interna-
tional law by treaty is straightforward, the concept of customary interna-
tional law is not. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States defines customary law as "a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."'"
Whether or not this particular definition captures every nuance of the
meaning of customary international law, it is broadly consistent with the
holding of the International Court of Justice on the subject and the writ-
ings of international law scholars. '
2
There is already substantial treaty law within the WTO system that has
explicit competition law components, although nothing amounting to a
unified whole. These provisions can be found in the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) covering trade in goods, as well as the
newer Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the General
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), the various sector agreements
negotiated pursuant to the GATS, and other parts of the WTO family of
agreements.' 3 At least some of these agreements contains explicit rules
governing the behavior of private parties in addition to governmental
units.
10. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para 1, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat.1055, 1060.
ii. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
12. See generally I REPERTORY OF DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE (1947-1992) 5-21 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 1995); MARK E.
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 15-62 (2d ed. 1997).
13. For the currently existing competition provisions in the WTO system are
set forth see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE NEED FOR INTEGRATING TRADE AND
COMPETITION RULES IN THE WTO WORLD TRADE AND LEGAL SYSTEM 20-23 (PSIO
Occasional Paper WTO Series No. 3, 1996).
14. See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, arts. 3, 4, 8, reprinted
1999]
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Other functioning competition systems derived from treaties include:
the elaborate competition rules and enforcement system of the European
Union, less developed rules within the North American Free Trade Area, a
fascinating but little known set of rules governing trans-border competi-
tion enforcement in the Australian New Zealand Free Trade Area, new
rules in the free trade area between Canada and Chile, the competition
protocol in the Mercosur agreement, and the ongoing negotiation of com-
petition issues in the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement. Other trea-
ties to consider include: the soft law of the resolutions of the United Na-
tions relating to restrictive business practices, multinational enterprises,
and the transfer of technology, the multiplying web of cooperation treaties
between antitrust enforcement agencies, and the thousands of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and other systems for the resolution of disputes be-
tween investors and host governments. 15
Turning to state practice, the question of any customary international
law in the area depends on the nature of state practice in the competition
field and the rules that states have adopted out of a sense of obligation.
Customary international law thus bears much in common with the com-
mon law and also has the classic advantage of the common law's empha-
sis on solving problems first and figuring out the rules later.
There has been a rush to embrace and adopt competition law across a
wide range of geographies, stages of development, former and present
ideological frameworks, and political circumstances. Gesner Oliveira, the
head of the Brazilian Antitrust Enforcement Agency, has been a leader in
characterizing a common set of stages in the development of competition
law for new antitrust regimes. He has contended that systems develop
from a modest program of domestic enforcement relying on technical as-
sistance from abroad to a robust enforcement system that actively cooper-
ates at the international level and participates in the work of regional and
international organizations in cooperating, harmonizing competition law,
and creating core principles of true international competition law.' 6 There
is a growing body of state practice, as well as both soft and hard interna-
tional law, that supports this characterization of the state of international
competition rules arising out of the work of international organizations
such as: the EU, the European Economic Area, the Europe Agreements
in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 149, 152-53, 157 (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
15. See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT
TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992). But see id. at 164 (describing present
limitations on investment dispute mechanisms).
16. See Gesner Oliveira, Competition Policy in Brazil and Mercosur: Aspects
of the Recent Experience, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 465, 466-70 (1998).
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between the EU and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Or-
ganization of Economic Co-operation and Development, the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation, the Strategic Impediments Initiative talks between
the United States and Japan and their aftermath, Mercosur, NAFTA, and
others.
The hardest part of the customary international law game is inducing
which specific rules have achieved such widespread acceptance arising out
of a sense of obligation that they should be deemed binding rules of cus-
tomary international law. Without entering into a fruitless debate as to
which specific rules of competition law have achieved such status (i.e.,
anti-cartel rules, monopolization, etc.), let me suggest that a strong case
can be made that international law requires that if a nation chooses to have
competition rules, it must enforce those rules in a non-discriminatory
manner.
Treaty and customary international law provides two frameworks in
which to measure this non-discrimination principle: namely the familiar
rules of both "national treatment" (NT) and "most favored nation" (MFN).
NT rules prohibit treating foreign products, services, or producers less
favorably than domestic producers, while MFN rules prohibit treating one
trading partner less favorably than another trading partner enjoying MFN
privileges.
These are familiar concepts within the WTO system and exist in virtu-
ally every trade agreement between nations. Even the current existing
versions of NT and MFN obligations within the WTO will cover many
classic competition problems, although certainly there will be situations
where individual cases may not fit well within the existing rules.
The current system can be used to resolve a variety of competition
problems and build a body of law that can point the way toward more
elaborate codes, if feasible and desirable, in the future. For example, ei-
ther under or over-enforcement of seemingly neutral competition based on
the domestic or foreign status of the petitioners or the respondents would
be captured within most definitions of either NT or MFN. A similar ar-
gument can be made that it is a violation of non-discrimination principles
to exempt export cartels in any antitrust system with a general anti-cartel
policy for its own domestic economy. It also should be a violation to ex-
empt exporters from antitrust rules and at the same time seek to impose
liability on foreign firms for harm solely to exporters. Similarly, a nation
with its own antitrust rules and notions of extraterritoriality, in theory or
in practice, would arguably be in violation of one or both of these princi-
ples if it sought to use blocking statutes or similar devices to shield its
firms from antitrust liability imposed by foreign systems which use similar
notions of jurisdiction to prescribe.
Most expansively, it may also be a violation of NT and MFN for one
antitrust enforcer to refuse enforcement cooperation sought by another
country when it routinely seeks and utilizes such cooperation to investi-
1999]
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gate foreign commerce matters. One could also construct a plausible ar-
gument that imposing anti-dumping duties on foreign goods in ways less
favorable than the treatment of domestically produced goods under price
discrimination statutes would also be a matter for WTO concern.
The prior reluctance of the WTO to use its dispute resolution system for
these types of disputes was not the product of a lack of rules, but rather a
consensus reached in 1960 to avoid the field. 17 While this consensus held
for nearly thirty-five years, it cracked because of the growth of competi-
tion law around the world, the changes to the world trading system itself,
the creation of the WTO, and the rise of new frontier issues of interna-
tional trade as a result of the demise of the tariff as a significant barrier to
trade. Ironically, the prior consensus also collapsed largely due to the
decision of the United States to bring (or threaten to bring) competition-
related matters before the WTO.
For example, the Kodak-Fuji dispute was brought to the WTO by the
United States in response to a successful petition filed by Kodak pursuant
to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 alleging that the Japanese gov-
ernment had encouraged and/or tolerated systematic anti-competitive
practices in the Japanese photographic film market. That case resulted in
a finding that any actions by the Japanese government were not in viola-
tion of WTO rules and any anti-competitive conduct was the product of
private conduct not subject to WTO rules.' 8
While the Kodak-Fuji dispute was pending before the WTO, the United
States also threatened to bring a second competition related matter for
dispute settlement. The merger between Boeing and McDonnell/Douglas
produced opposing merger control rulings in the United States and the EU.
17. See Restrictive Trade Practices: Arrangements for Consultations, G.A.T.T.
B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 170 (1961) (report adopted on June 2, 1960). See generally
JoHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 522-27 (1969).
18. The allegations in this matter are quite complex and the actual panel report
runs into the thousands of pages. For a discussion of the issues raised by the case
and the WTO panel decision see F.M. Scherer, Retail Distribution Channel Barri-
ers to International Trade, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 77 (1999); Jay L. Eizenstat, Com-
ment, The Impact of the World Trade Organization on Unilateral United States
Trade Sanctions Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of the
Japanese Auto Dispute and the Fuji-Kodak Dispute, 1I EMORY INT'L L. REV. 137
(1997); Renee Hardt, Note, Kodak v. Fuji: A Test Case for the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309 (1997); Hiroyuki Fujii,
Comment, The Kodak-Fuji Dispute: A Spectrum of Divergent Colors and a Blue-
print for a New WTO Procedure for Disputes Involving Government Toleration of
Anti-competitive Practices, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 317 (1997-98);
Gary N. Horlick & Yong K. Kim, Private Remedies for Private Anti-Competitive
Barriers to Trade: The Kodak-Fuji Example, 24 INT'L Bus. LAW, Nov. 1996, at
474.
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The United States cleared the merger announcing that the transaction did
not harm competition. The EU reached the opposite conclusion, but
reached agreement with the parties as to the conditions under which they
would not contest the acquisition. Both sides believed that the other's
decision was the product of industrial policy concerns over creating, or
protecting, national champions in the commercial aviation market rather
than promoting legitimate competition objectives. A WTO challenge
would have been likely had the EU blocked the merger in its entirety.
Finally, the EU has taken its turn in bringing a dispute resolution pro-
ceeding before the WTO, which deals with traditional competition laws.
The United States has a little-used provision called the Anti-Dumping Act
of 191619 which theoretically imposes criminal and treble damage liability
on certain forms of dumping. Despite a record of no known successful
use of the statute, the EU has challenged the lawfulness under the WTO of
suing European producers under this statute. The EU has argued that the
procedures for imposing anti-dumping duties under article VI of the
GATT and the WTO Anti-dumping Code are the exclusive remedy for
dumping violations.2 °
All of these examples, both hypothetical and real, involve existing rules
and the availability of a well-developed dispute resolution system capable
of answering the questions posed. Who wins any particular dispute de-
pends on the advocacy of the parties and factual and legal findings of the
dispute resolution panels. There is, however, a ready made system in
place to handle many of the competition issues that would otherwise be
the subject of endless negotiations if a full negotiating round were con-
vened to prepare a comprehensive competition code.
The answer in any particular case might be that the current rules do not
cover the problem at hand. Law is created through this process, either
positively or negatively, and can serve either as a substitute to, or as a
guiding path for, a true code of international competition law. That is
probably the best that can be expected for the foreseeable future and a
pretty good result in the real world.
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay was intended as a middle ground between two extreme posi-
tions that argue about what the world of international trade and competi-
tion law should be. I instead look at the world that already is. The WTO
and many other organizations and treaties have the existing law to create
an incremental international law of competition that can at least partially
19. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, §801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994).
20. See WTO Sets Up Dispute Panel on U.S. Antidumping Act of 1916, 16 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) at 192 (Feb. 3, 1999).
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serve the needs of the world trading system and prevent some of the com-
petitive abuses that go unchecked under the present system. 21 Using ex-
isting dispute settlement procedures, such as in the WTO, to test the limits
of how the present systems can handle competition disputes has the virtue
of solving real world problems using existing tools, albeit applying them
to new problems.22 The rest of the world may not view competition law,
or law making generally, in these very common law terms. However this
view has the potential of moving forward on an incremental basis until the
United States and other skeptics have been both petitioner and respondent
in true international competition cases and they have found that they can
live with the results.
21. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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